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Abstract
In this paper we focus on the consequences of skilled migration for source
(developing) countries. We …rst present new evidence on the magnitude of the
"brain drain” at the international level and then discuss its direct and indirect
e¤ects on human capital formation in developing countries in a uni…ed stylized
model. Finally we turn to policy implications, with emphasis on migration and
education policy in a context of international migration.
¤The …rst author thanks the World Bank for …nancial support (Contract PO. 7620076 - UPI
269656). We thank Arye Hillman and Maurice Schi¤ for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer
applies. Corresponding author: Frederic Docquier, CADRE, University of Lille 2, 1 Place Deliot,
























































































































In this paper we focus on the consequences of skilled migration for 
developing countries. We first summarize the recent findings of Docquier 
and Marfouk (2004) on the international mobility of the highly-skilled; 
their estimates, based on immigration data collected from nearly all OECD 
countries in 1990 and 2000, show that the “brain drain” has gained in 
magnitude over the period covered, but that substantial differences remain 
across regions and income groups. 
The central section presents the theoretical arguments of the ''new'' 
and ''old'' brain drain literatures in a fully harmonized framework. We first 
review the early brain drain literature, which tends to emphasize the losses 
to those left behind. We then ask whether the traditional detrimental 
effects stressed in the early literature may be offset by potentially 
beneficial effects emphasized in more recent contributions (remittances, 
return migration, creation of trade and business networks, and possible 
incentive effects of migration prospects on human capital formation at 
home), and provide empirical evidence on these different channels where 
available. According to most existing studies, it is unlikely that 
remittances, return migration or other ways through which highly-skilled 
emigrants continue to impact on their home country's economy are 
significant enough to compensate sending countries for the losses induced 
by the brain drain. By contrast, cross-country comparisons provide 
supportive evidence that migration prospects foster domestic enrollment in 
education. Additional investigations are clearly needed to assess the net 
effect of emigration on human capital formation at home. 
The last section explores some of the policy implications of the 
analysis, with emphasis on migration policy and education policy. We 
show that from the perspective of developing countries, the "optimal" 
emigration rate for the highly-skilled is zero where liquidity constraints 
are strongly binding and then conforms to an inverse-U shape pattern with 
respect to the country's level of development. As to education policy, we 
discuss the role of taxes and education subsidies when human capital is 
mobile internationally and show how optimal policy responses to such 
mobility are affected by the parameters of the model. 
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The current wave of economic globalization has opened a window of opportunity for
human capital to agglomerate where it is already abundant and yet best rewarded,
i.e., in the most economically advanced countries. This natural tendency has been
strengthened by the gradual introduction of selective immigration policies in many
OECD countries since the 1980s. What started as an e¤ort to increase the "qual-
ity” of immigration in countries such as Australia or Canada has developed into an
international competition for attracting the highly educated and skilled. Together
with traditional self-selection e¤ects on the supply-side, this explains the overall ten-
dency for migration rates to be much higher for the highly-skilled. While the world
export/GDP ratio has increased by 51 percentage points between 1990 and 2000
(WTO, 2004), the total number of foreign-born individuals residing in OECD coun-
tries has increased in the same proportion (51%) over that period, a …gure that jumps
to 70% for highly-skilled migrants against only about 28% for low-skilled migrants
(Docquier and Marfouk, 2004).
What are the consequences of this human capital ‡ight for sending (developing)
countries? In a world of perfect competition with complete markets, the free mobility
of labor would seem to be Pareto-improving: migrants receive higher incomes, natives
in the receiving countries can share the immigration surplus, and remaining residents
in the sending countries can bene…t from the rise in the land/labor and capital/labor
ratios. However, in the case of highly-skilled migrants, such labor movements also
generate a number of ”externalities” that have to be factored in. First, skilled mi-
grants are net contributors to the government budget and their departure, therefore,
increases the …scal burden on those left behind (…scal externality). Second, skilled
labor and unskilled labor complement one another in the production process; in a
context of scarcity of skilled labor and abundant unskilled labor, as is the case in
developing countries, skilled labor migration may have a substantial negative im-
pact on low-skilled workers’ productivity and wages (intragenerational spillover) and
increase domestic inequality. Third, human capital depletion through emigration
would seem to impact negatively on a country’s growth prospects, inasmuch as hu-
man capital formation is now viewed as a central engine of growth (intergenerational
spillover). Fourth, as demonstrated in various new economic geography frameworks
(e.g., Fujita et al., 1999), skilled labor is instrumental in attracting FDI and fostering
R&D expenditures (technological externality); hence, the mobility of human capital
is contributing to the concentration of economic activities in speci…c locations, at the
expense of origin regions.
On the other hand, high-skill migration may also induce positive feedback e¤ects
as skilled emigrants continue to a¤ect the economy of their origin country. Such
possible feedbacks include migrants’ remittances, return migration after additional
skills have been acquired abroad, and the creation of networks that facilitate trade,
capital ‡ows and knowledge di¤usion.
3Given the many channels involved, an evaluation of the exact impact of the mi-
gration of skilled labor (the ”brain drain”) for source countries is a very complex task.
As we shall advocate in this paper, most of this impact may ultimately be captured
through the e¤ect of emigration on the composition of the labor force, that is, on the
stock of human capital per worker remaining in the home country. Until recently,
empirical attempts in this direction have been hampered by the lack of harmonized
international data on migration by origin country and education level. In the absence
of such empirical material, the debate has remained almost exclusively theoretical.
The early ”brain drain” literature of the 1970s emphasized its negative consequences
for those left behind. The main conclusions were that skilled emigration contributes
to increased inequality at the international level, with the rich countries getting richer
at the expense of the poorer countries. By contrast, more recent contributions ask
whether the traditional negative e¤ects of the brain drain stressed in the early lit-
erature may be o¤set by possible bene…cial e¤ects arising from remittances, return
migration, creation of trade and business networks, and possible incentive e¤ects of
migration prospects on human capital formation at home.1 In particular, a new brain
drain theoretical literature has emerged around the idea that migration prospects may
well foster human capital formation in developing countries even after actual emigra-
tion is netted out; this literature studies the theoretical conditions under which the
overall e¤ect of the brain drain may be positive (i.e. brain drain reduces international
inequality). During the last two decades, there has been a signi…cant increase in the
magnitude of the brain drain. However, as recent theories show, it could be that
some developing countries have experienced a social gain from this brain drain.
We …rst summarize in Section 2 the data on the magnitude of the brain drain, and
then provide new estimates on the international mobility of the highly skilled; our
measures are based on immigration data collected from nearly all OECD countries
for 1990 and 2000 by Docquier and Marfouk (2004). These data show that the brain
drain has gained in magnitude over the period covered although substantial di¤erences
remain across countries and regions. Section 3 presents the theoretical arguments of
the ”new” and ”old” brain drain literatures in a fully harmonized framework: we …rst
review the early brain drain literature, and contrast it to more recent models. We
also review the various channels whereby skilled migrants may impact on their home
country after they have left (remittances, return migration, networks), and provide
evidence on these di¤erent channels when available. Section 4 is dedicated to policy
implications, with emphasis on migration policy and education policy in a context of
international migration. Section 5 concludes.
1Grubel and Scott (1969) already mentioned the various possible feedback e¤ects of the brain
drain for source countries (remittances, networks, innovation in the host country that may spillover
to the origin country, etc), and argued that the short-term loss (due to intragenerational and …scal
externalities) could well be o¤set in the the long run. However, such possible feedbacks were con-
sidered too small to make a di¤erence, and the brain drain literature of the 1970s focused on its
detrimental (short-term) impact.
42 How big is the brain drain?
There is clear evidence that the brain drain has increased dramatically since the
1970s, both in absolute and relative terms. Nearly 30 years ago, the United Nations
estimated the total number of highly-skilled South-North migrants for 1961-72 at
only 300,000 (UNCTAD, 1975); less than a generation later, in 1990, the U.S. Cen-
sus revealed that there were more than 2.5 million highly educated immigrants from
developing countries residing in the U.S. alone, excluding people under the age of
25 (that is, without counting most foreign students). Country studies commissioned
by the International Labor Organization also show that nearly 40% of the Philip-
pines’ emigrants are college educated, and, more surprisingly, that Mexico in 1990
was the world’s third largest exporter of college-educated migrants (Lowell and Find-
lay, 2001). Since 1990, the chief causes of the brain drain have gained in strength and
these increasing trends have been con…rmed. Indeed, selective immigration policies
…rst introduced in Australia and Canada in the 1980s have spread to other OECD
countries: the Immigration Act of 1990 as well as the substantial relaxation of the
quota for highly skilled professionals (H1-B visas) in the US constitute a very signi…-
cant change in the immigration policy of the country that remains the destination of
about 40% of the immigrants to the OECD area. Finally, a growing number of EU
countries (including France, Germany, Ireland and the UK) have recently introduced
similar programs aiming at attracting a quali…ed workforce (e.g., through the creation
of labor-shortage occupation lists) (OECD, 2002).
Until very recently, there were no comparative data on the magnitude of the
brain drain. The …rst serious e¤ort to put together harmonized international data on
migration rates by education level is due to William Carrington and Enrica Detra-
giache from the International Monetary Fund, who used US 1990 Census data and
other OECD statistics on international migration to construct estimates of emigra-
tion rates at three education levels (primary, secondary and tertiary schooling) for
about 60 developing countries.2 The Carrington-Detragiache (henceforth CD) esti-
mates, however, su¤er from four main shortcomings. First, CD assumed for each
country that the skill composition of its emigration to non-US OECD countries is
identical to that of its emigration to the US; for example, Nigerian immigrants in
the UK are assumed to be distributed across educational categories in the same way
as Nigerian immigrants in the US. Consequently, the CD estimates are not reliable
for countries for which the US is not the main destination. Second, at the time
CD conducted their study, the OECD immigration data (regarding the EU, Japan,
Switzerland, New Zealand...) did not allow for a full decomposition of the immigrants’
origin-mix; more precisely, the OECD published statistics indicating the country of
origin only for the top 5 or 10 sending countries. For small countries not captured
in these statistics, the …gures reported in the CD data set are therefore biased: the
2See Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999). Relying on the same assumptions, Adams (2003)
provides estimates for 2000.
5total number of emigrants is under-estimated, and in some cases one is (mis)led to
conclude that 100% their immigrants to the OECD area immigrated to the US; as
acknowledged by Carrington and Detragiache, this may approximate the reality for
Latin America, but is clearly erroneous, for example, in the case of Africa. Third,
the CD data set excludes South-South migration, which may be signi…cant in some
cases (e.g., migration to the Gulf States from Arab and Islamic countries, to South
Africa from neighboring countries, etc.). Finally, the de…nition of a migrant is simply
a foreign-born individual residing in the receiving country; it is therefore impossible
to distinguish between immigrants who were educated at the time of their arrival and
those who acquired education after they settled in the receiving country; for example,
Mexican-born individuals who arrived in the US at age 5 or 10 and graduated from
US high-education institutions later on are counted as highly-skilled immigrants. De-
spite these various shortcomings, the CD estimates constitute a …rst and very useful
step toward building a fully-harmonized data set on migration rates by education
levels.
In an attempt to extend Carrington and Detragiache’s work, Docquier and Mar-
fouk (2004) collected data on the immigration structure by education levels and coun-
try of birth from most OECD countries in 1990 and 2000. They use the same method-
ology and de…nitions as Carrington and Detragiache (1998),3 but extend their work in
a number of ways. They use Census data or speci…c and detailed surveys for nearly all
OECD countries: Census data reporting educational levels and countries of birth were
used for 11 countries in 2000 and 8 countries in 1990. Survey data were used for 13
European countries. These data give the immigrants’ origin for all source countries,
not only for the top 5 or 10 countries, thus preventing an under-representation of small
countries, as was the case for the CD dataset. In addition, for 24 out of 30 receiving
countries, the data collected also give the exact education structure of immigration,
while CD had to extrapolate this from the US data, with the US representing only
about 44.1% total immigration to the OECD. On the whole, the estimates are based
on accurate information on the immigration stock per country of origin and education
level (primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling) for 88.8% of adult immigrants in
1990 and 92.7% of adult immigrants in 2000. Hence, Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
provide ”reliable” estimates (i.e., based on precise information for at least 80% of the
total stock analyzed) for 175 countries in 2000 and 160 countries in 1990.4
Aggregating over countries, the total number of adult immigrants living in the
OECD area and aged 25 or more is estimated at 58.5 million in 2000 and 39.8 million
in 1990. Emigration rates by education levels are obtained by comparing the number
3Their estimates are based primarily on national census and register data. Survey data were
also used when census statistics were not available or not su¢ciently detailed. In a limited number
of case where data by country of birth are not available, immigrants are de…ned as residents with
foreign citizenship (e.g., Germany, Japan, Italy or Korea).
4At the same reliability rate, Carrington and Detragiache (1998) provided reliable estimates for
about 25 countries.
6of emigrants to the population from which they are drawn. The latter information
is taken from the Barro and Lee (1993) data set on educational attainments. At
the world level, 1.66% of the working age population is living in a foreign country.
The worldwide average emigration rates amount to 0.94%, 1.64% and 5.47% for low-
skill, medium-skill and high-skill workers, respectively. As apparent from Figure 1,
emigration rates for high skilled workers are strongly correlated to (but always higher
than) total emigration rates.
Figure 1. Skilled workers' and total emigration rates






























































































































































































y = -2.6935x 2  + 3.2068x - 0.0064
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Regarding receiving countries, two major trends characterize the evolution of mi-
gratory patterns between 1990 and 2000: (i) Quality-selection is more and more im-
portant and, (ii) Low-income countries are increasingly a¤ected by the brain drain.
The worldwide average rate of emigration for skilled workers has increased by 0.75
percentage point over the period 1990 and 2000, against only 0.06 percentage point
for low-skill workers and 0.41 for medium-skill workers. As shown on Figure 2, most
skilled emigrants choose the USA as destination (…g 2.A)5. More importantly, the
share of skilled workers in the total stock of immigrants has increased in all receiv-
ing countries, and more so in Canada and Australia, the two countries which were
the …rst to introduce selective immigration policies o¢cially (…g 2.B). In all OECD
countries, the proportion of skilled immigrants originating from low-income countries
has increased, especially in North America, with a notable increase of highly-skilled
immigration from Asian countries (…g 2.C).
5In 2000, about 44% of the OECD adult immigrants lived in the US. This proportion jumps to
50% for skilled immigrants.













A. Destination of skilled immigrants in percent of the OECD













B. Skilled immigrants in percent of the immigration stock













C. Percentage of skilled immigrants from low income countries
Variation 2000-1990 Year 1990 Year 2000
8Regarding sending countries, the intensity of the brain drain di¤ers if it is mea-
sured in absolute or relative terms. Table 1 provides the 30 most a¤ected and least
a¤ected countries in 2000. Only countries with a population higher than 4 million are
included. Looking at absolute numbers the Philippines, India, China, Mexico but also
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada appear as the major sending countries.
When looking at relative numbers (i.e., in proportion of the local educated labor force
at origin), skilled emigration appears to be particularly strong in Central America
and the Paci…c Region, with …gures higher than 80% in countries such as Guyana,
Jamaica, or Suriname.
Table 1. Emigration (stocks or rates) of skilled workers in selected countries
(excluding countries with population < 4 millions)
Emigration stock in 2000 Emigration rate in 2000 Emigration rate in 2000
30 largest stocks 30 highest rates 30 lowest rates
1 United Kingdom 1 542 011 Haiti 81.6% Sweden 4.4%
2 Philippines 1 260 879 Somalia 58.6% Egypt 4.2%
3 India 1 021 613 Ghana 42.9% China 4.2%
4 Germany 1 016 007 Mozambique 42.0% India 4.2%
5 China  906 337 Sierra Leone 41.0% Moldova 4.2%
6 Mexico  901 347 Vietnam 39.0% France 3.9%
7 Canada  566 833 Nigeria 36.1% Libya 3.8%
8 Italy  470 331 Madagascar 36.0% Burma (Myanmar) 3.4%
9 Vietnam  446 895 El Salvador 31.5% Venezuela 3.3%
10 United States  428 078 Nicaragua 30.9% Brazil 3.3%
11 Korea, North  422 518 Lebanon 29.7% Burkina Faso 3.3%
12 Korea, South  384 497 Croatia 29.4% Belarus 3.0%
13 Poland  379 266 Cuba 28.9% Nepal 2.7%
14 Cuba  336 419 Hong Kong 28.7% Georgia 2.6%
15 Japan  331 892 Papua New Guinea 28.2% Azerbaijan 2.6%
16 France  301 717 Sri Lanka 27.5% Spain 2.6%
17 Iran  282 587 Kenya 26.3% Argentina 2.5%
18 Taiwan  280 710 Angola 25.6% Australia 2.3%
19 Russian Federation  263 041 Senegal 24.1% Paraguay 2.3%
20 Jamaica  260 850 Honduras 21.8% Thailand 2.2%
21 Hong Kong  254 805 Dominican Republic 21.7% Indonesia 2.0%
22 Brazil  254 467 Uganda 21.6% Japan 1.5%
23 Netherlands  240 494 Guatemala 21.5% Russian Federation 1.3%
24 Ukraine  237 395 Burundi 19.9% Kazakhstan 1.1%
25 Colombia  232 596 Rwanda 19.0% Uzbekistan 1.0%
26 Ireland  220 545 Serbia and Montenegro 17.4% Kyrgyzstan 0.7%
27 Romania  217 198 Ethiopia 17.0% Saudi Arabia 0.7%
28 Peru  183 915 United Kingdom 16.7% Tajikistan 0.7%
29 Pakistan  174 884 Tanzania 15.8% United States 0.5%
30 New Zealand  172 582 Slovakia 15.3% Turkmenistan 0.1%
Despite a strong within-group heterogeneity, Figure 3 illustrates interesting di¤er-
ences between groups. Average migration rates are computed by region, by income
group (for the four categories distinguished by the World Bank) and and by country-
size groups (above 25 million, from 10 to 25 million, from 4 to 10 million and below
4 million). Regarding the regional distribution (see …gure 3.A), the most a¤ected
9regions are Africa and Europe6. The Paci…c region and Asia exhibit intermediate
rates, and the …gures for American countries as a whole are small.7 The regional dis-
parities are extremely stable between 1990 and 2000. Regarding income groups (see
…gure 3.B), it is worth noticing that the highest rates are observed in middle-income
countries. High-income countries (less incentive to emigrate) and low-income coun-
tries (where liquidity constraints are more binding) exhibit the lowest rates. Between
1990 and 2000, the situation clearly improved in lower-middle-income countries and
deteriorated in low-income countries. Finally, regarding country-size groups, there
is a clear decreasing relationship between the emigration rate and the country size.
Disparities are also extremely stable over time.
Spatial clusters may also be distinguished, as apparent from the world map in
Figure 4. In North and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, South-Central
and Eastern Asia, North and South Africa, brain drain is rather small. On the
contrary, brain drain has a very important impact on the human capital structure of
the labor force in the Caribbean, Central America, South-Eastern Asia, Western and
Eastern Africa. The proximity with the USA is an obvious key factor explaining the
situation of the Caribbean and Central America. Countries from South Eastern Asia
(Vietnam, Philippines, Laos) have a more diverse portfolio of destinations as they send
migrants to the USA, Canada and Australia. For African countries, colonial ties with
European countries such as the UK (Gambia, Ghana, Somalia), France (Mauritania,
Djibouti), or Portugal (Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique) are key determinants of
migrants’ locations.
6Migration between European countries is counted.
7The American average rate is clearly driven by the US.











































A. Average rate by region
1990 2000
11Figure 4. Emigration rate of the highly skilled - world mapWe now turn to the economic theories that have analyzed the determinants and
consequences of international skilled-migration ‡ows for developing countries.
3 Theory and evidence
This section provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the
consequences of highly-skilled emigration for source countries. This issue has given
rise to a large body of research since the late 1960s, with the early literature generally
supporting the view that the brain drain is detrimental to those left behind and the
more recent literature providing a more balanced view. We …rst present the general
set-up, reformulate the results of early contributions within this framework, and then
introduce the various channels emphasized in later research. We also present the
existing evidence on each particular channel.
3.1 The model
Consider a stylized small open economy populated by two-period lived individuals. At




t . For simplicity, the stock of capital, Kt; is assumed to be composed
of foreign investments only (no domestic savings), and the labor supply, Lt; sums
up skilled and unskilled labor. Normalizing the number of e¢ciency units o¤ered by
an unskilled individual to 1, a skilled individual o¤ers h>1 such units. The scale
factor is time-variable and can be positively related to the economy-wide average
level of human capital of the adults remaining in the country, Ht; itself a function
of the proportion of skilled workers in that generation, Pt: Therefore, we have Ht =
1+Pt(h¡1),w i t hPt the share of skilled workers and h>1 their relative productivity,
and At = A(Ht);with A
0
¸ 0 .8
This latter mechanism allows us to introduce the spillover e¤ects associated to hu-
man capital formation. The international mobility of capital is such that the marginal
productivity of capital equals to the world interest rate (r¤) plus a risk premium (¼t)
associated to internal factors such as risk, political instability, corruption, individual









® ´ w(¼t;H t)
with the derivatives w
0
1 < 0 and w
0
2 > 0.
When young, people are o¤ered the choice between working as unskilled workers
or devoting part of their time to education. There is a single education program, the
cost of which is proportional to the domestic wage rate wt. However, individuals are
8We will later restrict the values of h to ]1;2[ to obtain interior solution when we assume an
uniform distribution of abilities.
13heterogenous in the ability to learn and may therefore be characterized by di¤erent
education costs, with high-ability individuals incurring a lower cost. The cost of ed-
ucation for a type-c agent is denoted by cwt; with c distributed on [0;1] according
to the cumulative distribution F(c). When adult, skilled (educated) and unskilled
agents work full-time, with education enhancing one’s productivity and, thus, one’s
income, by an exogenous skill premium h 2 [1;2].9 Utility is linear in consumption
and there is no time-discount rate. There is no domestic saving so that the stock of
capital is totally owned by foreign investors.
Without migration, the lifetime income for an uneducated agent is wt +wt+1.B y
contrast, the lifetime income for an educated agent is wt ¡ cwt + wt+1h. Clearly,
education is worthwhile for individuals whose education cost is lower than a critical
value. At the steady state (wt+1 = wt), the condition for investing in education in an
economy with no migration (henceforth denoted by the subscript n)i s :
c<c n ´ h ¡ 1:
In poor countries, however, liquidity constraints are likely to impact on education
choices. Assume, that the …rst-period consumption cannot be lower than a minimal
threshold, Áwt, which is assumed to be proportional to wages. Hence, an agent
with education cost above cL ´ 1 ¡ Á has no access to education, and the liquidity
constraint may or may not be binding depending on whether cL ? cn:
Consequently, the economy-wide average level of human capital of the current
generation of adults may be written as:
Hn =1+Pn(h ¡ 1)
where Pn = Min[F(cn);F(cL)] m e a s u r e st h ep r o p o r t i o no fe d u c a t e da d u l t s .
Let us now examine the impact of skilled migration on the sending economy. In
the model with private education funding, the impact of migration on remaining
residents is related to the way it a¤ects the composition of the labor force. What
matters is the e¤ect of migration on the equilibrium wage rate. If the stock of human
capital per worker remaining in the home country decreases (resp. increases), the
wage rate also decreases (resp. increases) and there is a loss (a gain) of welfare for
those left behind. For di¤erent reasons, we are aware that the relationship between
welfare and skilled migration is likely to depend on other channels which are not
modeled here:
² As we shall argue in the policy discussion (see section 4.2), results can be
di¤erent under public funding of education. Suppose maintaining the same
average stock of human capital requires increasing subsidies and taxes, then
uneducated workers (who receive no subsidies) experience a welfare loss due to
the reduction in net wages (despite constant gross wages);
9Given c 2 [0;1],t h er e s t r i c t i o nh<2 ensures that the proportion of educated is lower than one
when c is uniformly distributed.
14² As developed in section 3.5, a rise in welfare can be obtained with decreasing
human capital when migration gives rise to international transfers. For the main
recipients, disposable income can rise despite decreasing wage rate;
² Another possible criticism is that migration is likely to a¤ect welfare through
non-income channels. Buidling on the idea that individuals obtain pleasure from
interaction with those with whom they share social capital (including norms,
language, culture and more), Schi¤ (2002) models the negative externality of
emigration per se for those left behind. Even if empirical evidence on social
capital and migration is limited, the ”social capital drain” is likely to reduce
welfare despite constant income.
To avoid using a welfare criterion, our analysis focuses on the impact of the brain
drain on the economic potential of the sending country, summarized by the average
stock of human capital among remaining members.
3.2 The traditional view
The …rst ”modern” economic papers on the impact of highly-skilled migration on
source countries date back to the late 1960s (Grubel and Scott, 1966, Johnson, 1967).
Their conclusions were not too pessimistic. For example, Grubel and Scott (1966)
argued that the short-term loss to the source country (due to the intragenerational
and …scal externalities outlined above) could well be o¤set in the the long run thanks
to various possible feedback e¤ects in the form of remittances, networks e¤ects, or
innovations that may spillover from the host to the origin country. However, such
possible feedbacks were considered too small to make a di¤erence, and the brain drain
literature of the 1970s focused on its detrimental (short-term) impact.
The central conclusion of the early brain drain literature, namely, that the brain
drain is detrimental to the welfare of those left behind, relies on a number of critical
assumptions: (i) Migrants are self-selected among the pool of emigrants, (ii) there
is free mobility and, hence, no uncertainty regarding future migration opportunities
and, (iii) there is a complete disconnection between emigrants and their country of
origin once they have left (no diaspora e¤ect, no return migration, no remittances).
In such conditions, clearly, emigration can only a¤ect negatively the proportion of
educated in the remaining population, P:
Building on the stylized model above, consider that workers now have the possi-
bility to emigrate toward a developed country where, due an exogenous technological
gap, one unit of human capital is paid w¤ >w t. The wage ratio can be written as
!t = w¤=wt = !(Pt) with !
0 < 0. Migration involves a cost kw¤ which captures trans-
portation, search, assimilation and psychological costs of leaving one’s home country.
Individuals have to choose whether to educate or not (ED or NE), and whether to





U(ED;NM)=wt ¡ cwt + wt+1h
U(ED;MI)=wt ¡ cwt + w
¤(h ¡ k)
At the steady state, the condition for a self-selection equilibrium to emerge (i.e.,
skilled workers only emigrate) is :




In this case, migration prospects impact on the critical ability level required for
investing in education; the condition for investing in education becomes:
c<c o ´ !(h ¡ k) ¡ 1
which is higher than cn = h ¡ 1 providing that the self-selection condition holds.
There is a great deal of evidence that migration prospects indeed impact on peo-
ple’s decisions to invest in higher education. For example, in their survey on medical
doctors working in the UK, Kangasniemi et al. (2004) evaluate that the migration
premium in the medical profession lies between 2 and 4 (in PPP values); about 30% of
Indian doctors surveyed acknowledge that the prospect of emigration a¤ected their
e¤ort put into studies; furthermore, the doctors surveyed estimate that migration
prospects a¤ect the e¤ort of about 40% of current medical students in India. Focus-
ing on the software industry, Commander et al. (2004) estimate that the migration
premium for Indian IT workers contemplating emigration to the US lies between 3 to
5 (depending on the type of job) in PPP values.10 According to the IOM (2003), the
prospects of working abroad have increased the expected return to additional years of
education and led many people to invest in more schooling, especially in occupations
in high demand overseas.
Migration prospects stimulate domestic enrollment in education but actual emi-
gration deprives the country of its educated citizens, the proportion of educated in
the remaining population falls to zero, and the average level of human capital of
remaining members falls to 1.
In the presence of a minimal threshold for consumption, migration can be limited
by an additional liquidity constraint. Liquidity constraints are due to the monetary
fraction of the migration costs only (as psychological costs of leaving and assimilation
costs are incurred only once migration has occured). Let us denote by k
0w¤ <k w ¤
10In current $, the migration premium is much larger (higher than 10 for many countries). Many
migrants confess that they were unable to compare earnings on a PPP basis. The expected migration
premium is likely to lie between the PPP and the current $ values.
16this monetary component of the migration cost. Agents with education costs above
cM ´ 1 ¡ k
0! ¡ Á<c L cannot both educate and migrate. A positive number of
educated individuals thus remains in the source country when the threshold cM is
lower than cn. In this case indeed, individuals with personal ability between cM and
cn cannot a¤ord paying for both migration and education costs but still have an
incentive to invest in education (see case 1 on Figure 5). When cM is higher than
cn, however, agents who cannot a¤ord paying for migration costs have no incentive
to educate and all the educated would leave the country at the end of period 1 (see
case 2 on Figure 5).
Figure 5. Brain drain, education choices and liquidity constraint
       Case 1. A positive share of educated remains Case 2. All the educated leave
   U          U
 cM     cn        co c   c n  cM  co     c
Basically, the central prediction of the traditional view is that once migration
opportunities are introduced, the average level of human capital among remaining
residents decreases. The e¤ect on natives’ income depends on A(Ht), through which
various types of externalities can be considered. Building on the idea that the so-
cial return to education is higher than its private return, the literature of the 1970s
generally concluded there was a detrimental e¤ect based on the externality argument
(Hamada, 1977, Usher, 1977, Blomqvist, 1986). In a similar spirit, Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974) developed a model of wage determination in which the departure of
skilled workers also reduces unskilled workers’ expected earnings. The mechanism
whereby skilled workers’ emigration negatively impacts remaining workers’ wages in-
volve a mechanism of wage-setting that accounts for ine¢ciences of labor markets
in developing countries. Assume that there are two types of workers (educated and
uneducated), and wages for the educated are determined by workers’ unions and in-
corporates an element of international emulation (i.e., depend positively on wages
abroad). Once skilled-workers wages are set, unskilled-workers wages follow with
some rule of proportionality. In this setting, skilled migration reduces skilled un-
employment, meaning that wage pressures become stronger. While the net e¤ect
on skilled employment depends on the elasticity of demand for skilled labor (deter-
17mining whether the skilled labor wage bill increases or not), this tends to extend
unemployment and reduces welfare among the uneducated.
Note that Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), as well as McCulloch and Yellen (1977),
take into account the incentive e¤ects of the brain drain on education decisions,
with the increase in the expected-wage for skilled workers stimulating human capital
investments; they also raise a number of questions regarding optimal public …nancing
of education in such a context, an issue that we will deal with in Section 4.
Modern theories of endogenous growth have considerably renewed the analysis
of the relations between education, migration and growth. Unsurprisingly, the …rst
models to address the issue of the brain drain in an endogenous growth framework
also emphasized its negative e¤ects (e.g., Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995).
At the same time, a series of studies have tried to promote the simple idea that one
should also look at how a given stock of human capital is built up. In particular,
it is likely that in the presence of huge inter-country wage di¤erentials, as is the
case between developing and developed countries, the prospect for migration deeply
modi…es the incentive structure faced by developing countries’ residents when mak-
ing their education decisions. When migration is temporary or when the education
decision is made in a context of uncertainty regarding future migration opportunities,
a bene…cial brain drain or a brain gain may result for the source country.
3.3 Temporary migration
Let us …rst introduce return migration and temporary visas. As documented in in-
ternational reports (e.g., OECD, 1998), most receiving countries have recently made
admission conditions for candidate immigrants more restrictive. On the one hand, as
detailed in the introduction, selective procedures have been put in place; on the other
hand, most new speci…c immigration programs targeting the educated and skilled are
designed for temporary immigrants, the general trend being towards an increase in
the share of temporary visas relatively to permanent visas. Assume, therefore, that
candidate immigrants are allowed to spend only a fraction ° of their working life
in the destination economy. Substituting temporary for permanent visas reinforces
self-selection among migrants: the expected return to education being lowered, fewer
people will invest in education and only those at the upper-end of the ability dis-
tribution will …nd it bene…cial to do so. Obviously, the exact impact on those who
would have invested in education would visas had been permanent visas, depends on
the length of the migration period. In terms of our notations, the lifetime income for
18educated agents are now given by:11
U(ED;NM)=wt ¡ cwt + wt+1h
U(ED;MI)=wt ¡ cwt + °w
¤h +( 1¡ °)hwt+1 ¡ kw
¤
At the steady state, emigration is optimal for skilled workers when the following
condition holds:
°h(! ¡ 1) >k !
If the latter condition does not hold, migration prospects have no e¤ect on human
capital formation. If it holds, the perspective of temporary migration stimulates
human capital investments.
Without liquidity constraints, the condition for investing in education becomes:
c<c ° ´ °(! ¡ 1)h + h ¡ 1 ¡ k! if °h(! ¡ 1) >k !
<c n ´ h ¡ 1 if not
In the …rst alternative, and assuming a uniform distribution of abilities, the pro-





Graphically, the case of temporary migration is similar to the case of permanent
migration, except that the incentive e¤ect is propotional to °. Nevertheless, the
major di¤erence is that, by contrast to the case with permanent visas, the incentive
e¤ect partly bene…ts to the sending country. Indeed, the probability P° can be lower
or higher than Pn. Formally, a possibility of ”bene…cial brain drain” emerges if the
derivative of P° with respect to ° is positive for low values of °, i.e. a value such








(h ¡ 1)(h ¡ 2) + h(! ¡ 1) ¡ k!
[1 ¡ °(h ¡ 1)]
2 Q 0
If this derivative is positive, there is an interval of ° for which the temporary
migration of skilled workers can stimulate the share of educated workers in the source
country and, in turn, the economy-wide average level of human capital.12 Several
elements are likely to mitigate this result, however. First, liquidity constraints are
11Note that for simplicity we assume migration costs to be identical as in the case of permanent
migration. This could be justi…ed by assuming that higher transportation costs (since people now
travel both ways) strictly compensate for reduced psychological costs, or that the latter are incurred
at the …rst years following immigration. Alternatively, we could assume that in the case of a
temporary migration, people incur a migration cost of k0 + °(k ¡ k0) ´ k00.
12Clearly, for ° =1 , the traditional view applies: the e¤ect of brain drain is unambiguously
detrimental.
19likely to limit the size of the incentive e¤ect. If c° >c L, some agents have no access to
education in spite of the fact that education is optimal, which reduced the likelihood of
a bene…cial brain drain. Similarly, if liquidity constraints restrict migration prospects,
the incentive e¤ect is thereby weakened. In the particular case where cM >c n,t h e
number of individuals engaging in education is constant and temporary migration
reduces the share of educated workers.
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) argue that a bene…cial brain drain could
emerge even if the share of educated workers decreases. This is shown in a setting
where growth is exogenous at destination and endogenous at origin, with the sole
engine of growth there being knowledge accumulation embodied in migrants returning
from the more advanced country. Their caveat relies on knoweldge di¤usion, that is,
on the idea that the more advance technology spillovers to the developing country as it
is in a way carried out by returning migrants. To the extent that returnees contribute
to the di¤usion of the more advanced technology they experienced abroad, emigrants’
return is therefore a potential source of growth for their home country. This means
that return migrants come back with a productivity gain, £h>h , which stimulates
the average level of human capital. The average stock of human capital then becomes:
H =1+P°(£h ¡ 1)
which must be compared to the case of no migration, H =1+Pn(h ¡ 1).
In a companion paper, Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2004) show that a shift in
immigration policy, with an increase in the share of temporary visas, may bene…t to
the sending countries of educated migrants. Two e¤ects of the proposed shift in immi-
gration policy are described: a decrease in the incentives to acquire education, which
reduces the pre-migration stock of human capital at origin, and a higher proportion
of returnees among emigrants, which increases the country’s stock of knowledge, a
complement of human capital. Their paper derives the theoretical conditions required
for an overall positive e¤ect to occur.
Using a di¤erent perspective, Stark et al. (1997) elaborate on the possibility of a
brain gain associated with a brain drain in a context of imperfect information with
return migration. In their setting, workers’ productivity is revealed at destination
only after a certain period of time during which people are paid according to the
average productivity of their group. Some relatively low-skill workers will therefore
…nd it bene…cial to invest in education so as to migrate and be pooled at destination
with high-skill workers; once individuals’ ability are revealed, the low-skill workers
return to their home country, which may therefore bene…t from their educational
investments.
There is limited evidence that return migration is signi…cant among the highly-
skilled, or that skilled returnees largely contribute to technology di¤usion. We know
that in general, return migration is characterized by negative self-selection (Borjas
and Bradsberg, 1996) and is seldom among the highly skilled unless sustained growth
preceded return. For example, less than a …fth of Taiwanese PhDs who graduated
20from US universities in the 1970s in the …elds of Science and Engineering returned
to Taiwan (Kwok and Leland, 1982) or Korea, a proportion that rose to about one
half to two-thirds in the course of the 1990s, after two decades of impressive growth
i nt h e s ec o u n t r i e s . I si td u et ot h ee c o n o m i cb o o ma to r i g i no rt oc h a n g e si nt h e
immigration policy at destination? Recent evidence is quite mitigated.
On the one hand, the …gures for Chinese and Indian PhDs graduating from US
universities in the same …elds during the period 1990-99 are fairly identical to what
they were for Taiwan or Korea 20 years ago (stay rates of 87% and 82%, respectively)
(OECD, 2002). This would seem to be con…rmed by a recent survey which shows
that in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei, a large fraction of companies have been
started by returnees from the USA (Luo and Wang, 2001). In the case of India,
Saxeenian (2001) shows that despite the quick rise of the Indian software industry,
only a fraction of Indian engineers in Bangalore are returnees. According to these
papers, return skilled migration appears relatively limited, however, and is often more
a consequence than a trigger of growth.
On the other hand, a more recent and comprehensive survey of India’s software
industry was more optimistic and con…rmed the presence of network e¤ects and the
importance of temporary mobility (strong evidence of a brain exchange or a brain
circulation), with 30-40% of the higher-level employees having relevant work experi-
ence in a developed country (Commander et al., 2004). In their survey on medical
doctors working in the UK, Kangasmieni et al (2004) found that ”many” intend to
return after completing their training.
3.4 Uncertainty
Before 1965, the US immigration policy was based on country-speci…c quotas. This
quota system was abolished but various types of requirements and restrictions im-
posed by the US and other countries’ immigration authorities render the migration
decision very uncertain. Implicit or explicit size-quotas are e¤ectively in place, and
receiving an immigration visa, whether temporary or permanent, requires being in
a close relationship either with relatives or employers who must then demonstrate
that the migrant’s skills can hardly be found among native workers. Moreover, in
some countries, point-systems are used to evaluate the potential contribution of im-
migrants to the host economy. This means that at all stages of the immigration
process, there is a probability that the migration project will have to be postponed
or abandonned. Individuals engaging in education investments with the prospect of
migration must therefore factor in this uncertainty, creating the possibility of a net
gain for the source country. The conditions required for this possibility to materialize
have been the subject of a number of theoretical contributions (Mountford, 1997,
Stark et al., 1998, Vidal, 1998, Beine et al., 2001).
To account for this within our general framework, assume that the probability
of migration depends solely on the achievement of a given educational requirement,
21which is observable, and not on individuals’ ability, which is not perfectly observable
(i.e., migrants are assumed to be randomly selected among those who satisfy some
kind of prerequisite with informational content regarding their ability - in our case,
education).13 The model with uncertainty looks like an out-selection model where
receiving countries accept a fraction p>0 of skilled candidates and reject all unskilled
applications. Alternatively, it can be considered as a model of self-selection in which
unskilled workers have no incentive to emigrate while skilled migration is optimal but
limited.
Assume moreover that the subjective probability of getting a visa, as seen by a
potential migrant, equals the proportion of the educated who e¤ectively emigrated
within the previous generation (i.e., at the steady-state). Denoting by p this proba-
bility, the lifetime income for educated agents is now given by
U(ED;NM)=wt ¡ cwt + wt+1h
U(ED;MI)=wt ¡ cwt + pw
¤h +( 1¡ p)hwt+1 ¡ pkw
¤
Uncertainty and return migration induce similar e¤ects on the expected return to
education, which is lowered in both cases by contrast to the case of certain perma-
nent migration. However, several di¤erences are worth noticing. First, the incentive
mechanism here operates even for low values of p (remember that an incentive ef-
fect was obtaining with temporary migration only for ° ¸ k!
h(!¡1)). Second, even for
p = °, uncertainty generates more incentives to educate than temporary migration.
The reason for this is straightforward and has to do with the fact that uncertainty
reduces expected migration costs. However, uncertainty per se cannot be seen as a
source of knowledge di¤usion.
At the steady state, the condition for skilled migration being optimal is the same
as under certainty (i.e., 1 <! (1 ¡ k
h)); but now education is worthwhile for people
for whom:







Clearly, we have cp = cn when p =0and cp = co when p =1 .
As in the case of temporary migration, there is a possibility of bene…cial brain
drain for the sending country partly to the incentive e¤ect. The proportion of edu-
cated workers in the country becomes Pp =
(1¡p)cp
1¡pcp . This proportion Pp can be lower
or higher than Pn. A bene…cial brain drain can be obtained for some ranges of p,
13Our simpli…ed model assumes homogenous skill within educational groups. The size of the
incentive e¤ect would be di¤erent with heterogenous skills (see Commander et al, 2002). In reality,
immigration authorities may be combining education with other selection devices such as tests of
IQ or host-country language ‡uency. Would IQ be a perfect signal of ability and the only criterion
retained, migration could only be detrimental to human capital formation at home. Still, and to the
extent that IQ or other tests are imperfect signals of ability, an incentive e¤ect exist for intermediate
skilled workers (the probability to emigrate potentially increases with ability).
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As in previous cases, liquidity constraints are likely to lower the size of the incen-
tive e¤ect. If cp >c L, the incentive e¤ect will be limited to agents with education
costs comprised between cn and cL. A similar constraint applies if cp >c M.
What is the empirical evidence on this ”prospect” channel? To the best of
our knowledge, the …rst study to attempt at estimating the growth e¤ects of the
brain drain using cross-country comparisons is that of Beine, Docquier and Rapoport
(2001); in a cross-section of 37 developing countries, and after controlling for remit-
tances, they found that migration prospects have a positive and signi…cant impact
on human capital formation at origin, especially for countries with low initial GDP
per capita levels. This was a …rst but imperfect try since they used gross migration
rates as a proxy measure for the brain drain due to the lack of comparative data on
international migration by education levels.
In a subsequent study, Beine et al. (2003) then used the Carrington-Detragiache
estimates of emigration rates for the highest (tertiary) education as their measure of
brain drain; again, they found a positive and highly signi…cant e¤ect of migration
prospects on human capital formation, this time in a cross-section of 50 developing
countries. They also computed country speci…c e¤ects, with the following results.
First, countries that experienced a positive growth e¤ect (the ’winners’) generally
combined low levels of human capital and low migration rates, whereas the ’losers’
were typically characterized by high migration rates and/or high enrollment rates in
higher education (this is quite intuitive, since in this case most migrants are picked up
from a stock of people that would have engaged in education even without contemplat-
ing emigration). Second, they showed that except for extreme cases such as Guyana
and Jamaica, the growth e¤ects of the brain drain were relatively limited: around plus
or minus a maximum of 0.2% in terms of annual GDP per capita growth; this is not
negligible, however, in a dynamic perspective. Finally, it was also striking that while
there were more losers than winners, the latter included the largest countries in terms
of demographic size (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil) and represented more than 80%
of the total population of the sample. For the most part, these results are apparent
on Figure 6; incidentaly, it may be seen from the …gure that the within-country result
predicted by the theory outlined above (i.e., that some migration should be good as
long as it is not excessive) is what comes out at the cross-country level apparent on
Figure 6. The X-axis gives the Carrington-Detragiache migration rates for the highly
educated and the Y-axis gives the net growth e¤ect of the brain drain as computed
by Beine et al. (2003). The variability across countries at given migration rates is
due to the impact of other right hand side variables, and the curve itself is adjusted
using a second-order polynomial.
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Migrants’ remittances constitute another channel through which the brain drain may
generate positive indirect e¤ects for source countries. It is well documented that
workers’ remittances often make a signi…cant contribution to GNP and are a major
source of income in many developing countries. Remittances impinge on households’
decisions in terms of labor supply, investment, education (Hanson and Woodru¤,
2002, Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003), migration, occupational choice, and fertility,
with potentially important aggregated e¤ects. This is especially the case in poor
countries where capital market imperfections (liquidity constraints) reduce the set of
options available to members of low-income classes.
The literature on migrants’ remittances shows that the two main motivations to
remit are altruism, on the one hand, and exchange, on the other hand.14 Altruism
is primarily directed towards one’s immediate family, and then decreases in intensity
with social distance. By contrast, in principle, no such proximity is required in the
case of exchange; the exchange-based theory of remittances posits that remittances
simply ”buy” various types of services such as taking care of the migrant’s assets
(e.g., land, cattle) or relatives (children, elderly parents) at home. Such transfers are
typically observed in case of a temporary migration and signal the migrants’ intention
14See Rapoport and Docquier (2004) for a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature.
24to return. A particular type of exchange takes place when remittances are de facto
repayments of loans used to …nance the migrants’ investments in education and/or
migration, with altruism and social norms and sanctions making the intergenerational
contract self-enforcing. Hence, it is a priori unclear whether educated migrants would
remit more than their uneducated compatriots; the former may remit more to meet
their implicit commitment to reimburse the family for funding of education invest-
ments, but on the other hand, educated migrants tend to emigrate with their family,
on a more permanent basis, and are therefore less likely to remit (or are likely to
remit less) than someone moving alone on a temporary basis.
In our basic framework with constant marginal utility of income, remittances have
no e¤ect on the marginal cost and gain of education and in‡uence human capital
formation only when liquidity constraints are binding. Let us develop this particular
case when the distribution of abilities is uniform. Without migration, the share
of educated amounts to cL. With migration opportunities, as some educated agents
leave the country, two opposite e¤ects are observed. Initially, the number of educated
remaining in the country falls to cL ¡ cM. If emigrants remit part of their foreign
income, liquidity constraints become less binding for recipients in the source country.
The traditional negative e¤ect can therefore, in principle, be compensated by better
access to education for those left behind, with the total e¤ect depending on the
amounts transferred and on recipients’ location on the ability axis.
McCormick and Wahba (2000) obtain the result that highly-skilled migration may
bene…t to those left behind in a trade-theoretic model where migration, remittances
and domestic labor-market outcomes are jointly determined and multiple equilib-
ria arise, with the high-migration equilibrium pareto-dominating the low-migration
equilibrium. In a setting closer to the one used throughout this paper, Cinar and
Docquier (2004) develop a stylized model where skilled emigrants altruistically re-
mit part of their earnings to relatives in the source country. They assume that each
remaining resident receives an identical amount of remittances (which depends on
the proportion of migrants, the intercountry wage gap, and the altruistic parameter)
and characterize the transition path (i.e., the dynamics of transfers) and the long-run
equilibrium of this economy.
Assume that at the steady state, this transfer amounts to T. As shown on Figure
7, the e¤ect of remittances is to shift cL and cM to the right. With a uniform
distribution, and given that (cL+T)¡(cM+T)=cL¡cM, the proportion of educated
and the economy-wide average level of human capital are given by: PT =
cL¡cM
1¡cM¡T and
HT =1 + PT(h ¡ 1). A bene…cial brain drain obtains if HT >H n,t h a ti s ,i f
T>c M( 1
cL ¡ 1):
25Figure 7. Brain drain and remittances
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In other words, for a bene…cial brain drain to obtain through remittances, the
transfer received by each remaining resident must be relatively high so that a large
share of the population gains access to education. This do not seem to portray the
evidence from remittance data available in developing countries. Although remit-
tances are generally positively correlated with donors’ incomes, meaning that skilled
emigrants are presumably important remitters, the results from household surveys
are mixed. At an aggregate level, Faini (2002) shows that migrants’ remittances de-
crease with the proportion of skilled individuals among the emigrants and concludes
that ”this result suggests that the negative impact of the brain drain cannot be coun-
terbalanced by higher remittances”. This does not imply that remittances by skilled
migrants are negligible, especially if the proportion of temporary migrants increases;
for example, Kangasniemi et al (2004) show that nearly half (45%) of Indian medical
doctors working in the UK remit income to their home country and that remitters
transfer on average 16% of their income.
Instead of sending remittances to relatives at home, migrants may return after
they have accumulated savings abroad and use such savings for promoting invest-
ment projects (generally in small businesses). There is much evidence that low-skill
workers migrate with the aim of accumulating enough savings so as to access to self-
employment and entrepreneurship (e.g., Mesnard, 2004, and Mesnard and Ravallion
(2001) for Tunisia, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) for Turkey, Ilahi (1999) for Pak-
istan, Woodru¤ and Zenteno (2001) for Mexico, or McCormick and Wahba (2001) for
Egypt). The latter study o¤ers additional insights in that it shows that in the case
of literate migrants, both the amount of savings and the migration duration have a
signi…cant positive e¤ect on the probability of entrepreneurship upon return, while
the …rst proposition only holds true for illiterate migrants; this suggests that skill-
acquisition may be more important for relatively educated migrants than the need
to overcome liquidity constraints. In terms of our notations, increases in the stock of
physical capital through repatriated savings and acquisition of entrepreneurial skills
c a nb em o d e l e da san e g a t i v es h o c ko nt h er i s kp r e m i u m ,¼; which rises the stock
26of capital per worker, thus increasing local wages and decreasing the incentives to
emigrate.
3.6 Network e¤ects
Our analysis has so far focused on the long run steady state. In the short run, with
unanticipated migration, emigration of educated workers is a net loss to the home
country. As time goes by, however, successive cohorts adapt their education decisions
and the economy-wide average level of education partly (as in Figure 8a) or totally
catches up, with a possible net gain in the long run (as in Figure 8b) thanks to
the various channels detailed above. On the transition path, additional e¤ects are
likely to operate. In particular, there is a large sociological literature emphasizing
the creation of migrants’ networks that facilitate the movement of goods, factors, and
ideas between the migrants’ host and home countries. In this section we consider two
types of network e¤ects: networks that facilitate trade, FDI and technology di¤usion,
and networks that facilitate further migration.
Figure 8. The dynamic impact of brain drain
Detrimental brain drain Beneficial brain drain
   Ht          Ht
        0 t  0      t
An important socio-economic literature has emerge recently to analyze the conse-
quences of the constitution of migrants’ network on migration patterns. For example,
Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) outline a cumulative theory of migration, not-
ing that the …rst migrants usually come from the middle ranges of the socioeconomic
hierarchy, and are individuals who have enough resources to absorb the costs and
risks of the trip, but are not so a­uent that foreign labor is unattractive. Family
and friends then draw on ties with these migrants to gain access to employment and
assistance in migrating, substantially reducing the costs and risks of movement to
them. This increases the attractiveness and feasibility of migration for additional
members, allowing them to migrate and expanding further the set of people with
network connections. Migration networks can then be viewed as reducing the cost,
and perhaps also increasing the bene…ts of migration (Bauer et al., 2002, Munshi,
272003, and McKenzie and Rapoport, 2004, …nd strong evidence of such network ef-
fects); in other words, migration incentives become endogenous once network e¤ects
are introduced.
Building on this idea, Kanbur and Rapoport (2004) introduce networks e¤ects at
destination in a standard model of selective migration. In the spirit of Carrington
et al. (1996), they assume that migration costs, k, are decreasing with the size of
the network at destination, that is, with the number of migrants already emigrated
abroad. As explained above, the role of migrants’ networks is to di¤use information
on job availability and provide hospitality and help in job search. Hence, past mi-
gration progressively raises the expected return to education (net of migration costs)
and, therefore, domestic enrollment in education. For a given p or °,t h i sr a i s e st h e
optimal number of individuals engaging in education and the share of educated work-
ers remaining in the country. In this sense, migrant networks have positive e¤ects on
human capital formation and serve to mitigate the short-run detrimental e¤ects of
the brain drain.
Another type of network e¤ect consists in the creation of business and trade net-
works; such a ”diaspora externality” has long been recognized in the sociological
literature and, more recently, by economists in the …eld of international trade (Rauch
and Trindade, 2002, Rauch and Casella, 2003). In many instances indeed, and con-
trarily to what one would expect in a standard trade-theoretic framework, trade and
migration appear to be complements rather than substitutes (e.g., Gould, 1994). In-
terestingly, such a complementarity has been shown to prevail mostly for trade in
heterogeneous goods, where ethnic networks help overcoming information problems
linked to the very nature of the goods exchanged (Rauch and Casella, 2002, Rauch
and Trindade, 2002). How the relationship of substitutability or complementarity
between trade and migration is impacted by the skill composition of migration, how-
ever, remains unclear. In the same vein, whether FDI and migration are substitutes
(as one would expect) or complements remains an unanswered question, although
many case-studies suggest that migrants’ networks favor what sociologists have la-
belled ”brain circulation” or ”brain exchange” (e.g., Saxeenian, 2001, Arora and
Gambardella, 2004).
I nt e r m so fo u rn o t a t i o n s ,a n da si nt h ec a s eo fr e p a t r i a t e ds a v i n g s ,s u c hm i g r a n t
networks favoring knowledge di¤usion and foreign direct investment can be modeled
as a negative shock on the risk premium, ¼; with similar e¤ects on the capital/labor
ratio and, thus, on domestic wages and incentives to invest in education.
4 Policy implications
It follows from the theoretical and empirical survey above that the consequences of
the brain drain for source countries are ambiguous. Optimal policy responses are thus
unclear. In this section, we discuss two important policy issues regarding the source
countries, migration and education policies. Our discussion is based on the out-
28selection model combining liquidity constraints and uncertain migration prospects
(similar conclusions would be obtained in the self-selection model by combining liq-
uidity constraints and temporary migration). We consider the uniform distribution
of ability. Given the developments above, such a model can be summarized by the
following set of equations:




where ­ = !(1 ¡ k
h) ¡ 1 measures the foreign wage premium net of migration costs,
cn = h ¡ 1 is the critical agent in a closed economy, and cM is the critical threshold
level of the education cost when liquidity constraints are binding.
Intuitively, the premium ­ varies with the level of development of the source
country: it is high in a poor country and closer to unity in a middle-income or
transition country. Liquidity constraints also depend on the level of development, with
people living in poorer (and more unequal) societies being more credit constrained.
Finally, to formalize the role of education in the development process, we sim-
plify the externality assumed in our general setting (At = A(Ht))a n du s eas i m p l e
assumption regarding the socially optimal level of education. As in Azariadis and
Drazen (1990), we assume a threshold externality induced by the average proportion
of educated on the economy-wide productivity parameter. This can be written as
wt =w for Pt < P and wt = w for any Pt ¸ P. Hence, we consider that P is propor-
tion of educated allowing ot exit out of the poverty trap. Moreover, the incentive to
emigrate disappears when wt = w.
In such a framework, we examine the role of emigration (or immigration) policies
and education policies on the interplay between migration and human capital forma-
tion at origin. In doing so, we make two implicit assumptions: (i) increasing H is a
good thing and (ii) governments seek to maximize growth. We leave examination of
these two assumptions for later discussion.
4.1 The optimal rate of migration
As documented in our introduction, international migration is constrained by im-
migration policies in receiving countries. Origin countries may also set barriers to
the international mobility of their citizens, although there is an asymmetry here: for
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, setting barriers to entry is seen as legitimate
by the international community while setting barriers to exit is not.15 Nevertheless,
and before we turn to the policy implications of the analysis, it is interesting from
the perspective of a given source country to ask whether the optimal rate of skilled
emigration is positive.
15In addition, such barriers to exit are generally not enforceable for the simple reason that you
can catch and expell people once they are in but cannot force them to return once they are out.
29Assume that liquidity constraints are not binding; then, a bene…cial brain drain
obtains if Ppl >c n. This condition can be written as:





1 ¡ p(1 ¡ cn)
which is represented as the BB-locus in the (­;p)p l a n . C l e a r l y ,BB is increasing
in p. The higher the migration rate of skilled workers, the higher the foreign-wage
premium required to enhance human capital formation at home.
Similarly, and given the threshold externality introduced above, skilled emigration
as a source of growth may allow the home economy to exit out of the low-wage trap
if Ppl > P. This take-o¤ condition can be written as:






1 ¡ p(1 ¡ P)
¡ cn
¾
which is represented as the TT-locus in the (­;p)p l a n . C l e a r l y ,TT is decreasing
in p.N o t e t h a t ­TT(1) = ­BB(1). The intuition is clear: what matters here is
the expected return to education, which is positively a¤ected by p and ­; hence the
possible tradeo¤ between the two.
However, liquidity constraints are binding if cn + ph­ >c M. This condition can
be written as
­ > ­LL(p) ´
cM ¡ cn
ph
which is represented as the LL-locus in the (­;p)p l a n .LL is also decreasing in p.I n
the constrained case, a bene…cal brain drain emerges if p<p b ´
cM¡cn
cM(1¡cn) (this critical
migration rate corresponds to the intersection between ­BB(p) and ­LL(p)).At a k e -
o¤ obtains if p<p g ´
cM¡P
(1¡P)cM (this migration rate corresponds to the intersection
between ­TT(p) and ­LL(p)).
Figure 9 describes the cases of a poor and an middle-income economy. In poor
countries, the LL c u r v ei sa l w a y sb e l o wt h eTT curve, meaning that skilled emigration
may bring about a net welfare gain in the long run but not to the point where an
economic takeo¤ obtains. In the case of a middle-income economy, the LL curve
intersects with the TT curve for p = pg 2 [0;1].
The optimal migration rate, p¤, is obtained by maximizing P with respect to p:
the bold line in Figure 9 represents this solution. Below the BB curve, obviously, the
optimal migration probability is zero. Above the BB curve, p¤ is increasing with ­,a t
least as long as liquidity constraints are not binding. When p¤(­) intersects with the
LL curve, the latter then gives the actual optimal migration probability. Similarly, if
p¤(­) interesects with the TT curve, there are no longer migration incentives and the
actual optimal migration probability is then given by this TT curve. It should be clear
that once the TT curve is reached, the corresponding p¤ applies for one generation only
30since in subsequent periods, the proportion of educated in the remaining population
is such that the threshold externality for education is attained and migration is not
a relevant option anymore. To summarize, when incentive e¤ects are limited by
liquidity constraints, the optimal migration rate is given by the LL curve, and once
the economy exits out of the low-wage trap, the optimal migration rate is given by
the TT curve during the time interval required to reach the threshold proportion of
educated; then, migration comes to an end.
Finally, it is noteworthy that at least in principle, a bene…cial brain drain can
be observed for high values of p. All individuals want to educate if cn + ph­ > 1;
or equivalently, if ­ > 1¡cn
ph . Such a condition is represented by the II curve, which
interesects with the BB and TT curves at p =1 . Without liquidity constraints, a
bene…cial brain drain is unambiguously obtained even if p tends to 1. Given that the
economy lies above the II curve, the small number of remaining agents are all edu-
cated. Such a situation is obviously unrealistic since liquidity constraints would limit
education investments in a ”su¢ciently poor” economy. In terms of our notations,
we can expect that liquidity constraints become more binding as we analyze poorer
economies (cM decreases with ­).
Figure 9. Migration rate, human capital and development
Poor economy Transition economy
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Notes. The dashed area corresponds a detrimental beneficial brain drain area. The bold line represents the
optimal emigration probability given the migration premium Ω  (inverse representation)
4.2 Education policy
Our analysis relies on the assumption that the cost of tertiary education is entirely
borne privately. However, if the government (mainly because the social return to
education is higher than its private return) subsidizes human capital investments,
31public investment in primary, secondary and tertiary schooling are lost when edu-
cated workers emigrate. How does the presence of public expenditures in education
a¤ect our results? How should domestic government adjust their education policy to
increasing migration rates?
Let us introduce lump-sum taxes and education subsidies in our basic model.
The government levies a tax ¿wh on each remaining resident (educated or not) and
provide a lump-sum transfer µw to each young opting for education. The lifetime
income for both types of workers are given by
U(NE;NM)=w + w ¡ ¿hw
U(ED;MI)=w ¡ cw + µw + pw
¤(h ¡ k)+( 1¡ p)(wh¡ ¿hw)
Agents for which education is optimal are de…ned by
c<c µ ´ h ¡ 1+ph(­ + ¿)+µ
The budget constraint of the government can be written as
¿h= G + cµmµ + #(¿;µ)
where G is the amount of general public expenditure per capita, #(¿;µ) is a func-
tion measuring perception costs (increasing in both arguments), m is the number of
children by remaining adult (emigrants leave the country with their children).
In an economy without migration, the critical level of ability would be given by
cn ´ h¡1+µn with µn, the amount of subsidy balancing the budget constraint (with
at a x¿n). It is worth noticing that the tax rate has no in‡uence on the optimal
investment in education since both educated and uneducated agents pay the same
amount of tax. All other things unchanged (i.e. for given µ and ¿), skilled migration
has now a double positive impact on human capital formation: the return if higher
abroad and migration allows escaping paying domestic taxes.
Clearly, by stimulating education investment (cµ >c n), brain drain increases the
amount of public expenditures. To keep the budget balanced, the government has
to increase the amount of taxes or decrease the subsidy rate. Let us denote by
¢µ the decrease in subsidy decided by the government and by ¢¿ the increase in
taxes. The critical level of ability in the presence of migration can be rewritten as
cµ ´ cn+ph(­+¿n+¢¿)¡¢µ. Compared to an economy without public education,
two e¤ects are obtained. One the one hand, the incentive e¤ect of brain drain is larger
since migration gives individuals an opportunity to escape …scal pressure. On the
other hand, by potentially reducing the amount of subsidy, brain drain can discourage
education.
The conditions for a bene…cial brain drain and for economic take-o¤ become:
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In both conditions, the …rst term corresponds to the condition in an economy
without subsidies; the second term captures the cost of reducing subsidies (it makes
the condition for a bene…cial brain drain more restrictive); the third term captures the
additional incentive e¤ect of brain drain (the lower probability to pay taxes makes the
condition for a bene…cial brain drain less restrictive). The analysis can be completed
by introducing liquidity constraints. Let us denote by cM the level of ability above
which liquidity constraints impede education in an economy without migration. In an
economy with migration, this level of ability becomes cM¡¢µ (a lower subsidy means
stronger liquidity constraints). Balancing the budget through education subsidies
shifts the ­LL-locus upwards whilst balancing the budget through taxes has no e¤ect
on liquidity constraints.
Figure 10 compares the consequences of brain drain in an economy without pub-
lic education (dotted lines) and without public education (continuous lines). If the
budget is adjusted through taxes (constant subsidies), the case for a bene…cial brain
drain is stronger in the presence of public education. If the budget is adjusted through
subsidies, the case for a bene…cial brain drain is weaker.
Figure 10. Brain drain and education subsidies
    Adjustments through taxes Adjustment through subsidies
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Notes. The dotted lines depict an economy without public subsidies
 The continuous lines depict an economy with public subsidies
This results suggests that brain drain should not induce developing countries to
reduce education expenditures. It contrasts with the existing literature on the pro-
vision of public good and mobility. A study on education policy and brain drain
can be found in Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000). They develop a two-region model
where education is publicly funded and where skilled workers choose their location
by maximizing utility. They show that the mobility of skilled workers leads to under-
investment in public education by local authorities. In the Nash uncoordinated equi-
librium, the migration of skills induces deviation from the …rst best optimum. To
33restore optimality, they recommend sharing the total burden of education between
the local public sector and a supranational authority. Without supranational inter-
vention, …scal competition reduces the public funding of education.
Such results are not directly transposable to the very speci…c case of developing
countries, in which the …scal competition framework hardly appears as relevant. Eco-
nomically speaking, developing countries are small. Migration and capital out‡ows
(from one isolated sending country) are too small to a¤ect the receiving countries’
equilibrium wages and tax rates. Hence, changes in local education policies should not
induce signi…cant political reactions in receiving countries. Stark and Wang (2002)
develop an interesting theory where brain drain can help the education system to
reach optimality. Selective migration policies acts as a disguized education subsidy.
In case of bene…cial brain drain, they demonstrate that a positive probability of mi-
gration can enhance welfare of the remaining residents and nudge the economy toward
the social optimum. Hence, less taxes and subsidies are required to reach the social
optimum.
Such a result critically depends on the assumption that the …rst best can be
decentralized. On the contrary, our framework could be seen as a second-best model
where maximizing H is the best policy option (implicitly, it means that the maximal
attainable level of human capital will be lower than the social optimum). That
case seems particularly suited for analyzing developing countries. In this second-best
world, we …nd out that a tax adjustment is likely to be the best option in case of
detrimental brain drain.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The main conclusion to draw from the above analysis is that for any given developing
country, the optimal migration rate of its highly educated population is likely to be
positive. Whether the current rate is greater or lower than this optimum is an empir-
ical question that must be addressed country by country. This implies that countries
that would impose restrictions on the international mobility of their educated resi-
dents, arguing for example that emigrants’ human capital has been largely publicly
…nanced, could in fact decrease the long-run level of their human capital stock. This
also suggests that rich countries should not necessarily see themselves as free riding on
poor countries’ educational e¤orts. The di¢culty is then to design quality-selective
immigration policies that would address the di¤erentiated e¤ects of the brain drain
across origin countries without distorting too much the whole immigration system;
this could be achieved, at least partly, by designing speci…c incentives to return mi-
gration to those countries most negatively a¤ected by the brain drain, and promote
international cooperation aiming at more brain circulation.
On a …nal note, it is important to underline that what seems crucial at this stage
is to extend the empirical research on the growth e¤ects of highly skilled migration
for source countries. Two main directions are required: case-studies on the sectoral
34impact of the brain drain, as suggested by Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters
(2004); and extension of the cross-country comparisons. In particular, due to data
limitations, existing empirical studies (Beine et al., 2001 and 2003) are based on
cross-section regressions, meaning that they neglect the dynamics of migration rates
as well as the dynamics of education levels; in addition, in the absence of a time series
dimension, it is impossible to control for individual-country e¤ects in the regression
estimates. Given the strong heterogeneity of developing countries in terms of sizes,
levels of development, etc., such country-…xed e¤ects are likely to play some role
in the value of the estimates. However, the new estimates computed for 1990 and
2000 by Docquier and Marfouk (2004) should make it possible for further empirical
research to go part of the way toward addressing these concerns satisfactorily.
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